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DEFINING CIVIL DISPUTES: LESSONS FROM TWO
JURISDICTIONS
ELIZABETH THORNBURG * AND CAMILLE CAMERON †
[Court systems have adopted a variety of mechanisms to narrow the issues in dispute and expedite
litigation. This article analyses the largely unsuccessful attempts in two jurisdictions — the United
States and Australia — to achieve early and efficient issue identification in civil disputes. Procedures
that rely on pleadings to provide focus have failed for centuries, from the common (English) origins
of these two systems to their divergent modern paths. Case management practices that are developing
in the United States and Australia offer greater promise in the continuing quest for early, efficient
dispute definition. Based on a historical and contemporary comparative analysis of the approach to
pleadings in the United States and Australia, this article recommends that courts should rethink the
function of pleadings, alter litigation incentives, and refine case management practices. This will
lead to earlier issue identification, better framing of the discovery process, and a more efficient
litigation process.]
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I INTRODUCTION
For centuries, courts have searched for ways to get litigants to define the
parameters of their disputes. While this desire to get to the ‘real issues’ has a
long history, tight government budgets, limited funding for civil courts and high
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litigation costs have intensified courts’ efforts to narrow issues and to expedite
litigation. 1 Many litigants, however, prefer to keep their options open and are
hesitant to abandon viable claims and defences — even weak or tangential ones.
Litigants may lack the necessary information to evaluate the viability of their
positions. They may also see strategic advantage in delay or in increasing their
opponents’ litigation costs. For these reasons, parties often resist the courts’
efforts at issue narrowing. Plaintiffs may advance weak claims or conclusory
descriptions of their complaints. Defendants may refuse to go beyond skeletal
denials to provide information about the factual basis of their denials and
affirmative defences.
Court systems have adopted a variety of mechanisms to try to force or encourage greater clarity at earlier points in a dispute. Their traditional tools have been
the rules about pleadings, which use formal statements of the parties’ claims and
defences to outline the issues, share information, and weed out baseless claims.
While the rules have varied in different times and places, one common feature
has been a largely unsuccessful quest to focus litigation on the parties’ actual
dispute. 2 Some systems have used pleadings to emphasise the isolation of one
single issue of law or fact, while others have used pleadings to try to define and
confine litigation. Still other systems have limited pleadings to a notice-giving
function while trying to find other ways to achieve issue definition.
As the 20th century neared its end, courts adopted institutionalised systems of
case management. 3 Case management philosophy encourages judges to use
supervision, communication, attitude adjustment, deadlines, and sanctions to
achieve the goals of focus and disclosure that procedural rules have traditionally
assigned to pleadings and discovery. 4 If the parties and lawyers acting on their
own will not or cannot quickly and cooperatively identify the issues in dispute,
limit discovery to the optimal amount of information exchange, and arrive at an
agreed resolution of the dispute, judges increasingly have tried to find ways to
make it happen. Case management practices have evolved, moving from an
emphasis on judges setting and enforcing deadlines to ‘issue management’ —
judges participating at an early stage in structuring the issues in the case. 5
1 For a consideration of the impacts of limited government funding on the operation of civil courts,

2
3

4
5

see Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 45–51. For a consideration of the relationship between litigation costs and improved, early issue identification in
civil disputes, see Chief Justice Michael Black, ‘The Role of the Judge in Attacking Endemic
Delays: Some Lessons from Fast Track’ (2009) 19 Journal of Judicial Administration 88. See
also Deborah R Hensler, ‘Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System’ (2003) 108 Penn State Law Review 165, 174, where
the author discusses the relationship between decreased funding for courts, increased case filings
and the development of the court management movement.
Charles E Clark, ‘History, Systems and Functions of Pleading’ (1925) 11 Virginia Law Review
517, 518.
Stephen N Subrin and Thomas O Main, ‘The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted
Parallel Procedural Universe’ (2004) 79 Notre Dame Law Review 1981, 1999; Australian Law
Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report
No 89 (2000) 390 [6.3] (‘Managing Justice’).
See, eg, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Civil Litigation Management Manual (2001); Black, above n 1, 91–2.
For an overview of the evolution of case management in Australia from relatively undifferentiated timetabling, to more active and nuanced ‘differential case management’, to robust judicial

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965791

210

Melbourne University Law Review

[Vol 35

Although it is not often recognised, many of the goals of case management
overlap with the traditional goals of pleadings, so the courts have in a sense
created redundant regimes on parallel tracks.
This article will consider the wisdom and efficacy of these methods through
the lenses of two countries that have adopted different techniques for encouraging issue identification: Australia and the United States (‘US’). 6 The two
systems are similar enough that comparisons can be fruitful, but different enough
to offer a range of information about the impacts of diverse practices. Both are
common law systems that have inherited their pleading traditions from England,
and both have wrestled with the challenge of how best to strike a balance
between traditional pleading practice and effective issue management. Australia
still relies on fact pleading to identify issues, while moving tentatively towards
greater issue management. The US, however, has relied more heavily on issue
management but may be retreating from that trend and returning to fact pleading.
Each country has something to teach the other about issue definition, and the
successes and failures of both provide insights for any court system seeking a
just and effective way to expedite litigation.
In this paper we will argue that pleadings have failed, and will continue to fail,
to facilitate early issue definition in civil proceedings. While pleadings may
serve other useful purposes, there is no reason to spend litigant and court time in
precisely and laboriously calibrating the content of written pleadings. Case
management practices, while not without problems of their own, show promise
as a way to encourage realistic and early identification of the central issues in a
case, to focus discovery, and to specify the issues to be tried.
We will begin by examining a shared history, the evolution of pleading regimes in England. We will focus in particular on the origin of pleadings as an
oral exchange between the parties’ lawyers and the court for the purpose of
achieving issue identification. We demonstrate that many of the problems with
pleadings have remained constant across centuries and that one problem in
particular — the failure of pleadings to achieve early issue identification — has
preoccupied commentators and reformers. The article will then go on to consider
the history and present state of pleadings and case management in Australia and
the US.
Having thus set the historical stage and having compared and contrasted the
two systems, we then recommend ways to realign the functions of pleadings and
intervention, see Justice J R T Wood, ‘The Changing Face of Case Management: The New South
Wales Experience’ (1995) 4 Journal of Judicial Administration 121; Mark von Dadelszen, ‘Caseflow Management — In Search of the “Meaningful Event”’ (1996) 6 Journal of Judicial Administration 171; Black, above n 1. For an account of the American experience, see Judith Resnik,
‘Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries,
Civil Justice, and Civil Judging’ (1997) 49 Alabama Law Review 133.
6 There are, of course, many levels of courts faced with different kinds of management challenges
in these countries. This article will examine those that have been most affected by the type of
case management designed to force the early identification and narrowing of issues: the federal
courts and state superior courts in Australia and the federal courts in the US. We also recognise
that there are differences in the two countries’ procedural systems, legal professions, and political
climates that affect efforts to achieve early issue identification, but nevertheless believe that the
variables on which we focus — pleading and case management practices — are sufficiently
dominant to make comparisons worthwhile.
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case management to eliminate redundancy and allow each to do what it can do
best. First, we argue that the notion of ‘pleadings’ as gatekeeper and discloser of
detailed facts ought to be abolished. Instead, a more basic narrative statement of
claim and response can be used to outline a case. Second, we explain how
modern case management — whether through deadlines or through more active
issue management — can be used to achieve effective and early issue identification, and to shape the discovery process. Finally, because case management can
only perform these functions when used carefully and when supported by
appropriate incentive structures, we suggest some conditions that must be met
for case management to succeed in achieving effective issue identification where
pleadings and pleadings reforms have, for centuries, failed.
I I T H E H I S T O RY

OF

PLEADINGS

Australia and the US have inherited their civil procedure systems from England, and in both countries the current pleadings rules have evolved from that
common source. Until the mid 15th century, common law pleadings in England
were oral exchanges before a judge, who helped guide the parties to an issue of
law (to be decided by a court) or fact (to be decided by a jury). 7 The aim of the
oral pleadings exercise was to narrow the issues in dispute: 8
the debate between the opposing counsel, carried on subject to the advice or the
rulings of the judge[,] allowed the parties considerable latitude in pleading to
the issue. Suggested pleas will, after a little discussion, be seen to be untenable;
a proposition to demur will, after a few remarks by the judge, be obviously the
wrong move. The counsel feel their way towards an issue which each can accept and allow to be enrolled. 9

Over time, this practice of oral pleading was replaced by written pleading. 10
The reasons for this change are not entirely clear. A popular view is that oral
pleading was both a feature and a product of a society ‘where writing was
uncommon and where it was usual to make claims publicly.’ 11 As literacy
increased and litigation became more complex, so this view goes, it became
more convenient to plead in writing. 12 Over time, written pleadings changed,
from a narration of underlying events to a recitation of formulaic allegations that
matched the elements of legal theories. Their complexity was eventually treated
as natural and unavoidable. Supporters of stylised written pleadings boldly
7 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Procedure (Common Law Pleadings; Scott

8
9
10
11
12

Schedules), Working Paper No 14 (1975) 7–12 [2.1]–[2.8]. See also Fieldturf Inc v Balsam
Pacific Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 809 (1 August 2003) [3] (Finkelstein J) (‘Fieldturf’); F G Brennan,
‘Written Pleadings’ (1975) 12 University of Western Australia Law Review 33, 44–6.
John H Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner and Bruce P Smith, History of the Common Law: The
Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions (Aspen Publishers, 2009) 147–8, 253–5.
Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 1942) vol 3, 635,
quoted in New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 8 [2.3].
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 8–9 [2.4].
Ibid 8 [2.4]. See also Peter Goodrich, ‘Literacy and the Languages of the Early Common Law’
(1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society 422.
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 8 [2.4].
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claimed that common law pleadings ‘were so logical as to be inevitable’ 13 and
that the system of pleadings was so scientific and finely calibrated ‘that any
radical change must be for the worse, and would inflict damage not only on the
law of pleading but on the common law as a whole.’ 14 While pleading rules have
changed, these attitudes persist among those who have mastered the art of
pleading, and they have stood in the way of pleading reforms at many times and
in many places.
Some interesting possibilities were lost in the shift from oral to written pleadings, including ‘early settlements, instant definition of issues, [and] early
compulsory education of Court and counsel in the facts and relevant law.’ 15 The
shift also decreased the role of the judge in issue formulation. The development
of rules ‘as to what could be pleaded … implicitly required a re-definition of the
judge’s role, from that of organizer of the progress of the litigation and the
“enforcer” as to content, to being merely the facilitator and ultimate judicial
referee.’ 16 The court’s role shifted to applying the law to the facts only after
those facts had been determined by the jury. 17 In addition, the shift from orality
to writing led to the pleading of less factual information and more statements of
conclusions. 18 Pleadings tended to become more formulaic, as written pleadings
that had been used in the past became models for the future. The resulting
pleadings revealed relatively little about the real dispute, making trial by ambush
possible and acceptable. 19
Meanwhile equity courts, administered by the Lord Chancellor, evolved out of
petitions to the monarch. Their pleading system was far less structured. Bills in
equity were designed to convince the Chancellor to provide justice where the
common law could not, and so they looked more like stories, factual in nature
and made under oath. 20 Equity also employed ‘bills of discovery’, which
allowed questions to be put to the defendant and required those questions to be
answered under oath. There was no need for a single legal issue or a single
factual theory, as the Chancellor rather than a jury decided the case. 21 Unfortu-

13 W S Holdsworth, ‘The New Rules of Pleading of the Hilary Term, 1834’ (1923) 1 Cambridge

Law Journal 261, 262.

14 Ibid.
15 Brennan, above n 7, 45. When recent case management developments — such as the Federal

16

17
18
19
20
21

Court of Australia’s ‘Fast Track’ programme — are considered, it is interesting to note how the
things that Brennan bemoaned as lost by the shift to written pleading are being reclaimed in
modern case management practices, especially early identification of issues and early education
of court and counsel. See also Black, above n 1, 94.
D R Parratt, ‘“Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed …”: Civil Dispute
Resolution in Scotland — A Continuing Story’ in C H van Rhee (ed), Judicial Case Management
and Efficiency in Civil Litigation (Intersentia, 2008) 163, 168 (discussing a similar shift from
oral to written pleadings in 18th century Scotland). See also New South Wales Law Reform
Commission, above n 7, 8–9 [2.4], for comments on the changes to the role of judges brought
about by the switch from oral to written pleading.
S F C Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1981) 70–4.
Fieldturf [2003] FCA 809 (1 August 2003) [3] (Finkelstein J).
Ibid [5]; Brennan, above n 7, 45–6.
Milsom, above n 17, 82–7.
Ibid 82–3.
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nately, by the 19th century, equity too had become more structured and intricate,
and equity courts were infamous for their delay. 22
English procedural reformers began chipping away at pleading problems with
a series of changes in the 19th century, culminating in the 1873 and 1875
Judicature Acts. 23 These Acts consolidated law and equity into a single Supreme
Court of Judicature with simplified pleading rules, and the old forms of action
were effectively abolished. The new rules provided that ‘[e]very pleading shall
contain as concisely as may be a statement of the material facts on which the
party pleading relies, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved’. 24
While these reforms relaxed the rigidity that characterised common law pleading, they did not provide a system of pleading that achieved efficient definition
of the issues. In 1880, a committee led by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, dissatisfied with the state of written pleadings, stated that ‘as a general rule, the questions in controversy between litigants may be ascertained without pleadings.’ 25
They recommended that no party should deliver a pleading without leave of the
court, and the pleadings rules were so amended. 26 It seems that this reform was
ineffective because leave to deliver written pleadings was almost always asked
for and granted. 27 The new rule was revoked in 1933. 28 In 1953, the Committee
on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure (‘Evershed Committee’) concluded
that pleadings were prolix, that pleaders used boilerplate forms of pleading that
were ‘useless’, that defences often put every alleged fact in issue ‘without regard
to common sense or reality’, 29 and that matters of law were not commonly
pleaded even though they were sure to take the other party by surprise. 30 The
Committee’s recommended changes, which included dispensing with pleadings
in certain types of cases, were optional and do not seem to have resulted in any
substantial changes in practice. 31
22 Ibid 95–6.
23 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (Imp) 36 & 37 Vict, c 66; Supreme Court of Judicature

24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31

Act 1875 (Imp) 38 & 39 Vict, c 77. See Holdsworth, ‘The New Rules of Pleading’, above n 13,
271, quoting Sir Frederick Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law (Columbia University Press,
1912) 29, who discussed an unsuccessful and short-lived reform initiative in 1834 with the
Hilary Rules, leading to ‘an outbreak of new technicalities’.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 (Imp) 38 & 39 Vict, c 77, O XIX para 4.
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 10 [2.7], quoting ‘The Legal Procedure
Committee’s Report’ (1881) 25 Solicitors’ Journal 911, 911. See generally L C B Gower, ‘The
Cost of Litigation: Reflections on the Evershed Report’ (1954) 17 Modern Law Review 1, 5,
where Gower, commenting about 70 years later on the place of written pleadings in the English
civil justice system, observed that they were neither essential nor fundamental features of the
English legal system and could be ‘eradicated or at least modified, without a complete reorganisation’ of that system.
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 10–11 [2.7], quoting ‘The Legal
Procedure Committee’s Report’ (1881) 25 Solicitors’ Journal 911, 911.
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 11 n 19.
Ibid.
Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure, Final Report, Cmd 8878 (1953) 42 [117].
Ibid. See also Committee on Personal Injuries Litigation, Report, Cmnd 3691 (1968) 74 [254],
[256], where similar criticisms of pleadings in road accident cases were made.
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 11 n 20. The New South Wales Law
Reform Commission suggested that some of the Evershed Committee’s recommended changes in
pleading practice had been adopted in commercial cases.
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Forty years later, pleadings problems persisted and were revisited by Lord
Woolf in his Interim Report. 32 While his criticisms of pleadings practice have
much in common with those discussed above, there are a few distinctive
features. Lord Woolf assigned much of the blame for the failure of pleadings to
the adversarial system, especially party control of pre-trial procedure. 33 According to traditional adversarial principles, judicial pre-trial oversight of the content
of pleadings arises at the request of the parties in the form of applications for
particulars, to strike out a pleading, or for summary judgment. That oversight,
however, rarely results in better issue identification. Lord Woolf proposed
changes to pleadings rules, but thought that rule changes without increased
judicial scrutiny of the pleadings process would achieve nothing: ‘If there is no
expectation of judicial scrutiny, slapdash pleading and deliberate misuse can
flourish.’ 34 This solution is consistent with Lord Woolf’s view that ‘pleadings
themselves do not directly define issues or identify the area in dispute; by setting
out facts, they are the means to enable the court and the parties to do so.’ 35 Thus
Lord Woolf was reminding us of a piece of the puzzle that had been lost since
the switch from oral to written pleadings five centuries earlier — namely, the
role of the judge in issue identification. 36
The Woolf reforms also introduced ‘pre-action protocols’ — not pleadings in
the technical sense, but written communications between disputants that serve
the same function as pleadings. They are intended to provide a better and earlier
exchange of information about claims and defences, notice of the general
outlines of the facts in dispute, copies of the basic relevant documents, and an
opportunity to settle the matter. 37 For example, the pre-action protocol for
personal injury cases begins with a letter from the claimant setting out ‘a clear
summary of the facts on which the claim is based, together with an indication of
the nature of any injuries suffered and of any financial loss incurred.’ 38
The defendant’s reply is supposed to inform the claimant ‘whether liability is
denied and, if so, giv[e] reasons for their denial of liability including any
alternative version of events relied upon.’ 39 In this sense, these reforms recognised the (pre-commencement) utility of mutual information exchange, separate
in function from the formal, binding ‘pleadings’.

32 Lord Woolf, Department for Constitutional Affairs (UK), Access to Justice: Interim Report to the

Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (1995).

33 Ibid 154–5.
34 Ibid. See also Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice (Sweet

& Maxwell, 2nd ed, 2006) 235 [6.2].

35 Lord Woolf, Interim Report, above n 32, 153.
36 Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure, above n 34, 235–6 [6.1]–[6.4].
37 Lord Woolf, Department for Constitutional Affairs (UK), Access to Justice: Final Report to the

Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (1996) 107–11.

38 Ministry of Justice (UK), Civil Procedure Rules: Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims

(2010) 5 [3.2] (emphasis altered).

39 Ibid 6 [3.7].

2011]

Defining Civil Disputes: Lessons from Two Jurisdictions

215

A Australia
1

Pleadings
In Australia, a modified version of the pleading system created by the Judicature Acts is still generally in force. 40 Pleadings are intended to formulate the
issues between the parties, to give notice of the case that will be put at trial, and
to bind the parties to those issues. 41 Like English pleadings under the Judicature
Acts, the rules require parties to plead material facts only, not evidence. 42 Parties
may ask the court (and they often do) to require an opponent to supplement
pleadings with particulars to provide further details of the case to be made at
trial. 43
Australia also has a robust discovery regime. Superior courts have rules allowing for pre-trial party access to documents and information held by an opponent
and, in limited circumstances, access to documents before proceedings have
been commenced. 44 Thus, pleadings are not the only vehicle that assists parties
in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of their cases, in preparing for trial,
and in making informed decisions about settlement offers. 45
While there is wide agreement that the purpose of pleadings is early identification of the real issues in dispute, there is also wide agreement that this aim is not
being achieved by pleadings rules and practices. As Finkelstein J has stated, ‘no
one seriously suggests that the system of pleadings is adequate.’ 46 Among the
main criticisms that have been levelled at Australian pleadings practices are the
failure of parties to plead matters of fact and law, the failure of pleadings to
narrow the issues in dispute, and the tendency of parties to plead things that they
know they cannot prove and to deny allegations that they know to be true. 47
40 B C Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (Lawbook, 8th ed, 2009) 190; Brennan, above n 7, 33–4.
41 Cairns, above n 40, 193–5.
42 See, eg, Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 13.02, which requires

43

44

45
46
47

every pleading to ‘contain in a summary form a statement of all the material facts on which the
party relies, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved’. See also Federal Court
Rules 1979 (Cth) O 11 r 2; Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) r 406; Uniform Civil Procedure
Rules 2005 (NSW) r 14.7; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (NT) r 13.02; Uniform Civil Procedure
Rules 1999 (Qld) r 149; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 98; Rules of the Supreme Court
1971 (WA) O 20 r 8. Pleading law is not prohibited and is generally required if parties intend to
rely on a statutory claim or defence.
Note that the ‘rules of some jurisdictions expressly assume a distinction between material facts
and particulars, in some other jurisdictions the distinction is implied, and in a few jurisdictions
the distinction has been abolished’: Jill Hunter, Camille Cameron and Terese Henning, Litigation 1: Civil Procedure (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2005) 173.
Previous legislation in Victoria went further. For example, Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic)
s 34(2)(a), repealed by Civil Procedure and Legal Profession Amendment Act 2011 (Vic) s 7,
created a pre-litigation requirement that all persons involved in a civil dispute must exchange
‘appropriate pre-litigation correspondence, information and documents critical to the resolution
of the dispute’. The recent amendment to that legislation has removed this pre-litigation requirement, leaving it to courts to decide whether such requirements will apply and, if so, in which
categories of cases.
Hunter, Cameron and Henning, above n 43, 217.
Fieldturf [2003] FCA 809 (1 August 2003) [6].
See, eg, Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice
System in Western Australia, Report No 92 (1999) 72 [10.4]–[10.6]; Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Solving the Problems of Pleadings: Are There Lessons to Be Learnt for Civil Justice Reform in General?’ (1998) 8 Journal of Judicial Administration 36, 40, citing Australian Law Reform Com-
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Another criticism is that applications for amendments and for further and better
particulars of a pleading are commonplace, resulting in satellite litigation that
adds significantly to the cost of litigation but adds little to efficient and timely
issue identification. 48
Despite the consensus that pleadings are failing to identify issues promptly,
criticisms have generated various reform proposals but few actual changes. In
1975, F G Brennan QC wrote that there was little interest in any major changes
to pleadings rules and practice. 49 In the same year, the New South Wales Law
Reform Commission tackled some of these vexed pleadings issues in a working
paper, and recommended the abolition of pleadings in all non-jury actions. 50
While this robust recommendation seems to contradict Brennan’s pessimistic
view about a lack of appetite for pleadings reform, the failure of the 1975
Working Paper to result in any significant or lasting reform of pleadings tends to
support it. Twenty years later, the Australian Law Reform Commission discussed
the issue, 51 but its concerns about the deficiencies of pleadings rules and
practices were not addressed in its subsequent major report on civil justice
reform. 52
In 1999, the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia proposed significant reform of pleadings rules and practice. 53 Its final report observed that while
there had been many calls for reform, change had been slow and substantial
reform was long overdue. 54 The Commission recommended, among other
things, the abolition of pleadings, to be replaced with early, non-technical, nonlegalistic case statements in narrative form. 55 In its view, ‘[t]he system of formal
written pleadings is not itself of cardinal importance to the efficient administration of civil justice. But the function of pleadings — to define issues and provide
due notice “at the earliest possible stage” — is essential.’ 56 Despite the Commission’s bold statement, its proposals did not lead to any significant reforms of
pleadings rules or practice.
Other less ambitious reforms have been proposed and implemented in Australia in an effort to address pleadings problems. One of these is the ‘truth in
pleading’ requirement that an affidavit or certificate verifying the truth of the
contents of a pleading be presented. 57 Another attempt to achieve effective
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

mission, Review of the Adversarial System of Litigation: Rethinking the Federal Civil Litigation
System, Issues Paper No 20 (1997) [7.9]; Brennan, above n 7, 35–9; Black, above n 1, 90–1.
Brennan, above n 7, 35.
Ibid 33.
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 27 [8].
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Adversarial System of Litigation, above n 47,
[7.6]–[7.13].
Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice, above n 3.
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 47, 72–82 [10.8]–[10.26].
Ibid 71 [10.2].
Ibid 72–4 [10.8]–[10.10].
Ibid 71 [10.3].
See, eg, Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 11 r 1B, which requires legal representatives to
certify pleadings in writing; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 14.23, which requires
parties in many cases to file an affidavit verifying their pleading; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic)
s 42, which requires legal practitioners to certify that there is a proper basis for every allegation,
denial and non-admission.
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reform of pleadings practice has been to remove the prohibition against pleading
matters of law. Pre-Judicature Acts pleadings had been criticised for mixing fact
and law and for ‘conceal[ing] as much as possible what was going to be proved
at the trial’. 58 It was thought at the time of the Judicature Acts that if parties
were limited to pleading only facts, and not law or evidence, this would increase
the chances that the true facts in dispute would be revealed. Instead, lack of
focus on the applicable law tended to obscure the issues and lead to late-stage
amendments. The distinction itself also bred disputes. 59 As the Law Reform
Commission of Western Australia stated, ‘[t]he distinction between fact and law
in any event is often blurred and is of dubious utility in helping parties to
identify the real issues in a case and resolve them sooner rather than later.’ 60
The Federal Court of Australia has achieved what law reform commissions
could not, by abolishing traditional pleadings practices for cases in its ‘Fast
Track’. 61 The Fast Track resembles the ‘Rocket Docket’ case management
approach used in some US courts, which sets very short deadlines for pre-trial
activities. It began in 2007 as a pilot programme in the Victoria District Registry
(Melbourne) and has now been adopted nationally by the Federal Court of
Australia for commercial disputes whose trials will not exceed five days. 62 One
of its key features is to replace traditional pleadings with Fast Track Statements,
Responses and Cross-Claims. These documents must avoid undue formality,
describe the nature of the dispute, and identify the factual and legal issues
involved and the relief claimed. 63 Responses must clearly state the factual and
legal substance of the respondent’s case. 64 Michael Black, writing when he was
the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, identified the ‘interest in [the] elimination
of surprise and the efficient clarification of the issues in dispute’, 65 and the
rejection of traditional pleadings rules and practices, as bedrock principles of the
Fast Track approach. 66 The abolition of pleadings, combined with other features
of the Federal Court Fast Track discussed below, has reduced time-consuming
and expensive interlocutory pleadings disputes. Chief Justice Black’s early
evaluation of this new approach to pleadings was optimistic:
It has to be said that substitution of these statements for traditional pleadings is
not without its critics, but those involved in the process consistently report that
the statements have largely eliminated surprise, have avoided pleading arguments and have greatly assisted in the early identification of the issues. 67

58 Spedding v Fitzpatrick (1888) 38 Ch D 410, 414 (Cotton LJ), quoted in New South Wales Law

Reform Commission, above n 7, 10 [2.6].

59 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 10 [2.7].
60 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 47, 74 [10.10].
61 The Fast Track Directions are set out in Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note No CM 8 —
62
63
64
65
66
67

Fast Track Directions, 25 September 2009 (‘Fast Track Directions’).
Black, above n 1, 92.
Fast Track Directions pt 4.
Black, above n 1, 94.
Ibid 94 n 25.
Ibid 94.
Ibid.
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2

Evolution of Case Management
When case management was finding a place on Australian reform agendas in
the early 1980s, it was more about timetabling and scheduling, and less about
judges taking an early and active role in identifying the issues in dispute. 68 Party
and lawyer control, not active and early judicial involvement, were dominant
features of this approach. The shortcomings of this type of case management,
including increased backlogs and delays, 69 were soon recognised. Case management practices continued to evolve. Judges and registrars became more active
in the case management process, and the need to replace party control with judge
control was accepted and embraced. Further, differentiated case management
techniques — providing ‘pathways along which cases could proceed through the
court system at a pace, and with that degree of management, which was appropriate for their needs’ 70 — were implemented.
The development of case management in Australia was dealt a blow in 1997
by the decision of the High Court of Australia in Queensland v J L Holdings Pty
Ltd (‘J L Holdings’). 71 At first instance, the judge refused to allow a late
amendment of a pleading because she was concerned that allowing it might
necessitate a postponement of the trial. 72 The High Court reversed that decision,
holding that no principle of case management ought to be allowed to supplant
the attainment of justice, ‘even in changing times’. 73 The Court also held that
case management principles could not be used, ‘except perhaps in extreme
circumstances, to shut a party out from litigating an issue which is fairly
arguable.’ 74 The impact of this case has been described as follows:
These comments simultaneously acknowledge and circumscribe the principles
and practices of modern case management that were emerging in 1997. The J L
Holdings precedent has become a part of the fabric of civil litigation and has
preserved a view that requests for amendments and adjournments ought to be
allowed as long as any prejudice can be compensated with an appropriate costs
order. … [P]ractitioners often cite J L Holdings, ‘as a quasi-biblical injunction
against any hard edge of case management principles that might press against
them’. The Victorian Law Reform Commission, referring to comments of the
Chief Justice of the State of Victoria, stated that, ‘parties all too often attempt to
exploit [the judgment] and judges and masters often feel their hands are tied’.
There is also judicial comment to the effect that the case has had a ‘chilling effect’ on case management and has ‘unfairly hamstrung courts’, especially in
complex commercial cases … 75

68 See, eg, Wood, above n 5, 124–7, where Wood describes the transition in New South Wales from
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

passive to active case management.
Ibid 124.
Ibid 128.
(1997) 189 CLR 146.
J L Holdings v Queensland (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Kiefel J, 28 August 1996).
J L Holdings (1997) 189 CLR 146, 154 (Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
Ibid.
Camille Cameron, ‘New Directions for Case Management in Australia’ (2010) 29 Civil Justice
Quarterly 337, 338–9 (citations omitted).
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In 2009, in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University
(‘Aon’), 76 the High Court revisited and overruled J L Holdings. The joint
judgment of Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated that the limits
imposed by J L Holdings on case management were not based on sound principle and were ‘not consonant with [the High Court’s] earlier recognition of the
effects of delay, not only upon the parties to the proceedings in question, but
upon the court and other litigants.’ 77
Notwithstanding the significant chilling effect of J L Holdings, initiatives by
federal and state courts to improve their case management processes continued
in the 12 year period between J L Holdings and Aon. The Federal Court adopted
its pilot Fast Track programme (discussed above), courts at the federal and state
levels developed case management protocols, and many individual judges
became more assertive case managers.
B United States
1

Pleadings
During colonial times and into the 19th century, US courts operated under what
was basically a common law system of pleading. 78 The most important 19th
century development came even before the Judicature Acts in England, as New
York in 1848 adopted what came to be known as the Field Code. 79 The Field
Code merged law and equity, abolished the forms of action, and eliminated the
search for a single issue in litigation. American procedural reformers were
concerned that common law pleading as it had come to be practiced ‘obscured
facts and legal issues, rather than distilling and clarifying them.’ 80 Therefore, the
Field Code required the plaintiff to plead in ‘ordinary and concise language
without repetition’ 81 the facts, not law, constituting a cause of action. 82 The
drafters of the Field Code wanted pleadings to lead to the ‘real charge’ as
quickly and efficiently as possible. 83 About half of the states adopted procedure
codes inspired by the Field Code during the next few decades, and this form of
pleading became known as ‘code pleading’. 84 Unfortunately, the requirements of
code pleading that the plaintiff plead ‘facts’ but not ‘evidence’ or ‘law’ generated

76 (2009) 239 CLR 175.
77 Ibid 217 [111].
78 Stephen N Subrin, ‘How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure in Historical Perspective’ (1987) 135 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 909,
927–8.

79 An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of This

State, ch 379, 1848 NY Laws 497 (‘Field Code’).
Subrin, above n 78, 932–3.
Ibid 934, quoting Field Code § 62.
Subrin, above n 78, 985.
Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings (New York), First Report of the Commissioners on
Practice And Pleadings: Code of Procedure (1848) 152–3 §133.
84 Subrin, above n 78, 939.
80
81
82
83
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an enormous motion practice and case law but failed to increase clarity or
decrease cost and delay. 85
Unhappiness with code pleading continued to grow, 86 and the eventual result
(in 1938) was a new set of rules for the federal courts: the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (‘FRCP’). 87 Charles Clark, the FRCP’s principal architect, had little
confidence in the capacity of pleadings, on their own, to clarify or narrow issues.
As he later explained, ‘every age must learn its lesson that special pleading
cannot be made to do the service of trial and that live issues between active
litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings’. 88 Accordingly, FRCP r 8 required only that the complaint include ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’. 89 The new
pleading system was reinforced by a pro-amendment attitude, as the rules
provided that permission to amend shall be freely given as justice requires. 90
The other significant change brought about by the FRCP was the adoption of a
number of discovery devices, including interrogatories, document production,
oral depositions, and requests for admission. 91 Discovery, rather than pleading,
was intended to aid in the identification of the disputed and undisputed issues
between the parties. 92
The functions formerly performed by pleadings alone were thus spread among
several pre-trial devices. Pleading became less central to the process of identifying issues, as discovery, pre-trial conferences, and summary judgment joined it
as methods of clarifying the scope of the lawsuit, sharing crucial information,
and eliminating meritless claims. 93 This system allowed more cases to advance
further and to encompass more issues compared to a system that used stylised
pleadings to force a single issue or a system that required factually specific
complaints before a case may proceed.
Some welcomed this result; it allowed greater private enforcement of legal
rights, and thereby went hand in hand with statutory and common law developments that created new rights. During the 20th century, Congress passed new
laws regulating business monopolies and securities markets, recognising labour
union rights, creating new consumer rights, and prohibiting discrimination in
85 For discussions of the courts’ extensive but unsuccessful attempts to distinguish between

86
87
88
89
90
91
92

93

pleading facts, pleading legal conclusions, and pleading evidence, see Walter Wheeler Cook,
‘Statements of Fact in Pleading under the Codes’ (1921) 21 Columbia Law Review 416, 416–17;
C E C, ‘Pleading Negligence’ (1923) 32 Yale Law Journal 483, 484.
Subrin, above n 78, 944–56.
Ibid 973.
Charles E Clark, ‘Special Pleading in the “Big Case”’ (1957) 21 Federal Rules Decisions 45, 46.
FRCP r 8(a)(2) (1938).
Ibid r 15(a).
Ibid rr 30, 33, 34, 36.
Edson R Sunderland, ‘Foreword’ in George Ragland Jr, Discovery Before Trial (Callaghan and
Company, 1932) iii, iii. See Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41, 47–8 (1957), where Black J delivered
the opinion of the Court and stated that ‘the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures … [will] define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.’ In large measure,
the FRCP adopted practices and mindsets that were characteristic of equity practice. See also
Subrin, above n 78, 974.
Kevin M Clermont and Stephen C Yeazell, ‘Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems’ (2010) 95
Iowa Law Review 821, 825.
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employment. 94 The common law also developed expanded rights for plaintiffs in
a number of areas, particularly in tort and warranty claims alleging injuries from
consumer goods. 95 While there was some agency oversight under these new
norms, private litigation was the primary vehicle for enforcing rights against
unwilling corporate defendants. The federal pleading rules allowed cases to go
forward even though the plaintiff did not have pre-suit access to evidence such
as the defendant’s internal practices or state of mind. Those facts did not have to
be alleged with particularity in the initial complaint but could be acquired during
discovery. The new laws, coupled with the new procedures, made litigation
against powerful entities more accessible for ordinary citizens. 96
Potential defendants, on the other hand, disliked the result. A rule that required
only a ‘short and plain statement of the claim’, as in FRCP r 8, with no requirement of particularised facts, made it easy to file a lawsuit that could turn out to
be baseless. Nor did it provide much in the way of limits on discovery, which
was allowed as to anything ‘relevant to the subject matter’ of the litigation, even
including information that was ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.’ 97 The discovery allowed by this system could be expensive, and since there is little fee shifting to prevailing defendants in US courts, 98
even defendants who won their cases could not recoup the costs of litigation.
These factors — notice pleadings rules, courts’ generosity in granting amendments, broad discovery and no costs shifting — have arguably made the US
debate about procedure reform considerably more politicised than it has been in
other countries. 99
By 1976, complaints about frivolous litigation, uncontrolled discovery, unethical attorney conduct, and excessive judicial discretion were gaining currency. 100
Although empirical studies have repeatedly shown that in most cases litigation

94 See, eg, Sherman Act, ch 647, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified at 15 USC §§ 1–7; Securities

95
96
97
98
99

100

Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 111-72, 48 Stat 881 (1934), codified at 15 USC §§ 78a–78jj;
National Labor Relations Act, Pub L No 7-198, 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified at 29 USC
§§ 151–69; Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub L No 90-321, 82 Stat 146 (1968), codified at
15 USC §§ 1601–1667f, 1671–7, 1681–1681x, 1691–1691f, 1692–1692p, 1693–1693r;
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Pub L No 93-637, 88 Stat 2183 (1975), codified at 15 USC
§§ 2301–12; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253 (1964),
codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
Stephen C Yeazell, ‘Re-Financing Civil Litigation’ (2002) 51 DePaul Law Review 183, 190–3.
See also ibid 183, which discusses changes in litigation financing make it easier for plaintiffs to
sue.
FRCP r 26(b) (1966 revision introduced this language, which was amended in 2000).
John F Vargo, ‘The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to
Justice’ (1993) 42 American University Law Review 1567.
Arthur R Miller, ‘From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure’ (2010) 60 Duke Law Journal 1, 5; Paul D Carrington, ‘Politics and Civil Procedure
Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience’ (2011) 60 Duke Law Journal 597, 599–600.
These views were expressed at the Pound Conference, held on the 70th anniversary of Roscoe
Pound’s famous 1906 address to the American Bar Association. The 1976 conference was sponsored by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of Chief Justices and the
American Bar Association. See generally ‘Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice’ (1976) 70 Federal
Rules Decisions 79.
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costs are modest and discovery is used appropriately, 101 rule-makers responded
to the complaints. Over the next few decades, the rules were amended in a
number of ways to try to impose more limits on litigation through changes to
discovery rules and requirements that pleadings have probable evidentiary
support. 102 In addition to actual rule amendments, the Supreme Court wrote
several opinions in the 1980s that changed the meaning of the summary judgment rule in a way that made it easier for defendants to terminate cases before
trial. 103
The pleading rules, however, remained unchanged, despite evidence that trial
courts were requiring heightened factual specificity in pleading in certain types
of cases. 104 The Supreme Court repeatedly reversed cases in which heightened
pleading requirements had been imposed by judicial fiat. 105 In addition, the
Advisory Committee on the FRCP refused to amend the pleading rules to require
plaintiffs to plead their claims with greater specificity before a case would be
allowed to proceed to discovery. 106
Repeat defendants such as large corporations and their insurers remain vocally
unhappy with the system and have continued to lobby for fundamental change.
For example, in 2010 a coalition including the Voice of the Defense Bar, the
Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, and the International Association
of Defense Counsel, prepared a White Paper for presentation to the Advisory
Committee on the FRCP. They argued in favour of amendments to the pleading
rules to require greater factual specificity, dismissal of cases that cannot be
pleaded in sufficient detail, very limited discovery, and early identification and
limitation of the issues. 107

101 For a review of the research, see Elizabeth G Thornburg, ‘Giving the “Haves” a Little More:

102

103

104
105
106

107

Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals’ (1999) 52 Southern Methodist University Law Review 229, 246–9. The most recent study is Emery G Lee III and Thomas E Willging, ‘Preliminary
Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’ (National Case-Based
Civil Rules Survey, Federal Judicial Centre, October 2009).
See Richard L Marcus, ‘Discovery Containment Redux’ (1998) 39 Boston College Law Review
747, 753–68; Richard Marcus, ‘Not Dead Yet’ (2008) 61 Oklahoma Law Review 299, 305; Rex R
Perschbacher and Debra Lyn Bassett, ‘The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents’ (2008) 61
Oklahoma Law Review 275, 292–3.
See, eg, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co Ltd v Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 US 574 (1986);
Anderson v Liberty Lobby Inc, 477 US 242 (1986); Celotex Corporation v Catrett, 477 US 317
(1986).
Christopher M Fairman, ‘The Myth of Notice Pleading’ (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review 987,
1011–59.
See, eg, Swierkiewicz v Sorema, 534 US 506 (2002); Leatherman v Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 US 163 (1993).
See, eg, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Judicial Conference of the United States,
Minutes — Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (3–5 May 1993) 22–3, which discusses but does
not adopt heightened pleading requirements for certain types of cases; Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, Judicial Conference of the United States, Draft Minutes — Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules (20 April 1995) 17–18, which discusses but rejects heightened pleading requirements.
See Barry Bauman, ‘LCJ White Paper Provides Impetus to New FRCP Initiative’ (2010) 18(5)
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel 5 <http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=
view&EntryNo=10925>.

2011]

Defining Civil Disputes: Lessons from Two Jurisdictions

223

2

Evolution of Case Management
Even Charles Clark, crusader for a minimally demanding pleading system,
contemplated the possibility that someone might have to step in and impose
limits. In 1924 he suggested that ‘there should be provided masters or court
officers to frame issues for the parties when these are not made clear by the
parties themselves.’ 108 The committee that drafted the 1938 FRCP considered a
proposal that would permit judges to enter an ‘[o]rder formulating issues to be
tried.’ 109 After hearing the parties argue, the judge could decide that there was
no ‘real and substantial dispute as to any one or more of the issues presented by
the pleadings’ 110 and eliminate them from the case. However, the drafting
committee rejected this plan, both because judges in many areas were considered
too busy to be narrowing issues and because allowing judges the right to ‘strike
out’ issues without a full record and with no right of appeal gave judges too
much power. 111 A hint of this plan survived, however, in FRCP r 16, which has
become the source of case management. The original version of that rule
suggested that pre-trial conferences could consider the simplification of issues,
although there was no indication that judges could force such simplification on
unwilling parties. 112
The case management movement in the US began in the mid 20th century as a
way to encourage judicial efficiency, and was reinforced by the adoption of a
system in which single judges handled entire cases from beginning to end. 113
This version of case management urged judges to keep track of case progress
and not to leave the pace of litigation to the parties; it consisted mainly of setting
interim deadlines and an early, firm trial date. In time, however, proponents of
case management sought a more forceful role in defining the nature of the
dispute. Judges had found that the setting of reasonable time limits required an
understanding of the issues in the case, and this in turn encouraged them to work
with the lawyers to try to identify and narrow those issues. Rule 16 was repeatedly amended, each time nudging the judge towards using more tools to provide
the focus and early disposition that were not provided by the pleading rules, and
finally requiring federal judges to undertake certain management tasks. 114 The
current version of FRCP r 16 shows that case management has precisely the
same goals as the pleading-discovery system: defining issues, sharing informa108 Clark, ‘History, Systems and Functions of Pleading’, above n 2, 550.
109 Subrin, above n 78, 978, citing Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Tentative Draft III (March

1936) r 24.

110 Subrin, above n 78, 978.
111 Ibid 979. See further Charles E Clark, ‘Summary and Conclusion to an Understanding Use of

Pre-Trial’ (1961) 29 Federal Rules Decisions 454, 455, where Clark, who later became a Second
Circuit judge, insisted that this kind of issue narrowing was designed to prepare the case for trial,
not to dispose of it.
112 Subrin, above n 78, 979. See also FRCP r 16(c)(2) (1938).
113 Judith Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 374, 395, 397–9; Hensler,
above n 1, 174.
114 See generally Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’, above n 113, 399–402; Resnik, ‘Changing Practices,
Changing Rules’, above n 5, 160–85, which describes the evolution of case management from
the 1940s onwards.
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tion, encouraging settlement, eliminating meritless claims, and positioning the
case for trial. 115
The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, in a manual written to guide federal trial
judges, emphasises the importance of early issue management:
One of the most important tasks in the initial case management conference is
early identification of the issues in controversy (in both claims and defenses)
and of possible areas for stipulations … Issue narrowing is aimed at refining the
controversy and pruning away extraneous issues. 116

Judges, it says, should not ‘blindly accept’ lawyers’ statements that they need
time to develop their cases, and should press for specific information about
witnesses and evidence. 117
In the context of this kind of case management, if the trial judge takes it seriously, there is little need to use motions to require more factual specificity in
pleading. In the US, therefore, motions requesting greater factual detail were
likely to be filed primarily by defendants in cases in which more detail might
reveal a fact destroying the plaintiff’s claim. 118 Only in those cases could the
pleadings give the defendant something that case management could not.
3

Pleadings Redux
Contrary to popular belief, discovery costs in most US cases are quite low, and
are proportional to the stakes involved in litigation. Consistent with earlier
studies, a 2009 report of the Federal Judicial Center confirms that the cost of
discovery and related pre-trial proceedings ranges from 1.6 per cent to 3.3 per
cent of the amounts in dispute. 119 There is, however, a small subset of cases that,
despite the existence of case management, remain contentious, complex, and
expensive. 120 The costs of defending these cases can be substantial, even for
cases that defendants believe to be meritless. Further, those costs will not
generally be shifted to the losing plaintiffs. 121 For these reasons, the US has seen
continuing pressure from repeat defendants for courts to create an enhanced
gatekeeping role for plaintiff’s pleadings. 122 Defendants are not as interested in
requirements that ask for more information about the basis for denials. Many
corporate defendants contend that management-based limits on discovery and
issues do not provide what they seek: an immediate end to litigation and its
115
116
117
118

119
120

121
122

FRCP r 16(a) (1938).
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, above n 4, 21.
Ibid.
Richard L Marcus, ‘The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice’ (1998) 76 Texas Law Review
1749, 1759. Marcus notes that because pre-trial orders supersede pleadings, setting limits for the
scope of litigation is not an important purpose for pleading practice, but pleading makes disposition on the merits available in a small percentage of cases: at 1756.
Lee and Willging, above n 101, 2.
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, Report to the Chief Justice of the United States on the 2010 Conference on
Civil Litigation (2010) 3 <http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010%20
report.pdf >.
Vargo, above n 98.
See, eg, Bauman, above n 107.
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attendant expenses. 123 They also argue that some judges will not use their
discretion and their managerial powers to impose sufficient limits on discovery
(and that plaintiffs’ lawyers will endeavour to file their lawsuits in those particular judges’ courts). 124
In two recent Supreme Court decisions, a majority of justices accepted this
argument, and as a result the Court reinterpreted FRCP r 8 to allow easier
dismissal of cases. In so doing, they harked back to code pleading’s distinction
between facts and law, or facts and conclusions. In Ashcroft v Iqbal (‘Iqbal’), 125
the Supreme Court extended a test first enunciated by the Court in Bell Atlantic
Corporation v Twombly (‘Twombly’). 126 The majority in Iqbal advised trial
judges that although they are required to take all facts pleaded as true, they are
not required to accept pleaded inferences. 127 If the judge finds those pleaded
inferences, characterised as ‘legal conclusions’, to be implausible based on the
judge’s ‘experience and common sense’, Iqbal instructs the trial judge to dismiss
the case without allowing discovery. 128
This use of fact pleading is different from that reflected in code pleading or in
Australia’s practice of requiring ‘further and better particulars’ — it is not about
notice or focus, it is about termination. 129 Iqbal and Twombly explicitly reject
the sufficiency of case management to control costs:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief
can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful
case management given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side. 130

While case management will undoubtedly continue in many cases, pleadings
have been reinvigorated as a way to limit litigation.

123 See, eg, Miller, above n 99, 11, commenting on the lobbying for the heightened pleading

124

125
126
127
128
129
130

requirement in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-57, 109 Stat
737, and stating at 15:
In recent years, the business community has used its influence to weaken the enforcement of
public laws and policies regulating their activities. Procedural modifications have been employed to achieve substantive changes for defense interests. With Twombly and Iqbal, the favored disposition technique has moved earlier in time from summary judgment to the motion
to dismiss.
Lawyers for Civil Justice et al, ‘Reshaping the Rules of Civil Procedure for the 21st Century: The
Need for Clear, Concise, and Meaningful Amendments to Key Rules of Civil Procedure’ (Paper
presented at 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, Duke Law School, 2 May 2010) x, 6–18.
129 S Ct 1937 (2009).
500 US 544 (2007).
Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1949–50 (Kennedy J for Roberts CJ, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas and
Alito JJ) (2009).
Ibid.
Kevin M Clermont, ‘Three Myths About Twombly–Iqbal’ (2010) 45 Wake Forest Law Review
1337, 1347–8.
Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1953 (Kennedy J for Roberts CJ, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas and Alito JJ)
(2009), quoting Twombly, 500 US 544, 559 (Souter J for Roberts CJ, Souter, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Breyer and Alito JJ) (2007). Twombly in turn relies on Justice Frank H Easterbrook,
‘Discovery as Abuse’ (1989) 69 Boston University Law Review 635, 638, where Justice Easterbrook states, ‘Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties control the legal
claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves.’
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Ironically, the Supreme Court’s new approach has created in the US the situation from which Australia is trying to escape by using case management — a
world in which parties and courts spend significant amounts of time on disputes
about the pleadings. Iqbal and Twombly have brought new life to pleading
motions, as evidenced by the fact that Twombly had been cited just under 24 000
times, and Iqbal more than 6000 times, as of March 2010, with both cases
racking up additional citations at a rate of over 500 per month. 131 Any court time
saved by early termination of a few cases may be outweighed by the added costs
of this preliminary skirmishing. Parties will incur additional costs and delay as a
result of these pleading motions. In addition, preliminary empirical data indicates that the specificity of pleading is not a good predictor of the plaintiff’s
ultimate ability to succeed on the merits. 132 From the standpoint of access to
justice, a return to a system in which full information is required at the outset
means that some meritorious claims will not be allowed to go forward and that
deep-pocketed parties will have a strong upper hand. 133
I I I F O R M U L AT I N G

A

MORE COHERENT APPROACH

In the two systems we have analysed, efforts to clarify and narrow issues
proceed on two parallel and overlapping tracks: rules that attempt to force
pleading of more specific facts, and case management aimed at issue identification. Managerial judges urge the parties to limit their cases to the ‘real issues’,
and parties try to force each other to plead with greater particularity. This
redundancy is inefficient in many ways. Unless each process serves a unique
purpose, doing both will increase costs to the parties and costs to the court
system. What, then, is the most effective way to provide the desired focus?
A Rethinking Pleadings
Attempts to require factual specificity in pleadings have failed for centuries to
achieve the desired level of issue definition. Common law pleadings became
intricate and formulaic, and thus uninformative. 134 US code pleading and
131 Adam N Steinman, ‘The Pleading Problem’ (2010) 62 Stanford Law Review 1293, 1357–60.
132 Alexander A Reinert, ‘The Costs of Heightened Pleading’ (2011) 86 Indiana Law Journal 119,

161–6. A recent study by the Federal Judicial Center, comparing motions to dismiss on the pleadings before Twombly and after Iqbal, has found a significant increase in the filing of pleadingsbased motions. It also found a general increase in the rate at which such motions were granted,
although they are normally granted with leave to amend. This seems to reflect a newlyinvigorated motion practice centering on pleading specificity, including increased party and court
costs. It has not, however, resulted in an increased rate of dismissal in most types of cases. For an
overview of this study, see Joe S Cecil et al, ‘Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
after Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’ (Federal
Judicial Center, March 2011) <http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/
$file/motioniqbal.pdf >.
133 The Supreme Court, however, may already have signalled a retreat from the most aggressive
readings of Twombly and Iqbal. In Matrixx Initiatives v Siracusano, 131 S Ct 1309, 1323
(Sotomayor J for the Court) (2011), the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the plaintiffs’
pleading of materiality and scienter in a securities fraud case, explaining that Twombly requires
only that pleadings ‘“raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence”
satisfying the materiality requirement’.
134 See, eg, Brennan, above n 7, 35–7.
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Australian pleading rules (including requests for further and better particulars),
while in theory requiring the revelation of facts, turn out to be similarly ineffective at forcing parties to define issues. The pleading requirements are often
satisfied by deferring to boilerplate forms that follow established pleading
precedents, but which reveal little about the parties’ actual claims and defences. 135 They also lead to expensive but unproductive interlocutory hearings
on pleading issues. While pleading law, rather than fact, is now permitted, one
legacy of the historical prohibition on pleading law is that some parties fail to
frame their claims in a legal context, leaving their pleadings incoherent and
uninformative. 136 A lack of candour and specificity in defendants’ responses also
impedes the ability of pleadings to generate clearly defined issues. 137 In any
case, modern US notice pleading never claimed to be a vehicle for significantly
narrowing the issues in a lawsuit.
Pleadings have failed as the key to issue identification for at least four reasons.
First, uncertainty encourages litigation, and pleading rules create uncertainty
because they turn on the difference between ‘facts’ and ‘legal conclusions’, and
allow ‘further particulars’ at the judge’s ad hoc, case-specific discretion. There
will therefore be little reason not to file a pleading motion if either success or the
cost of litigation itself could produce a strategic advantage. Second, in some
cases the time of initial pleading is simply too soon to expect certainty from the
parties. If necessary information can be acquired only through discovery,
attempts to require detailed pleadings are premature. Third, many courts have
interpreted the plaintiff’s burden of proof as requiring from the defendant
nothing but bare denials rather than explanations of the facts underlying those
denials. This is not conducive to a narrowing of the issues. Finally, the formality
and binding nature of pleadings puts lawyers in full adversary mode, with the
result that concessions are unlikely, strategic behaviour is maximised, and the
arguments focus on technicalities rather than a shared effort to resolve the
dispute.
A striking feature of the reform initiatives we examined above is that they all
endorse a completely different role for pleadings as the best response to our
seemingly incurable problems. The Australian proposals describe this as
‘abolishing’ pleadings (and replacing them with something else) 138 because
pleadings practice is such a part of the fabric of adversarial litigation that no
other type of reform, big or small, will make any appreciable difference. We
agree with this assertion. Improving the prospects of achieving early issue
identification requires significant reform of the fact pleading model.
The next obvious question is, what should replace pleadings? The result could
look like the proposals of the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia or
the Federal Court of Australia’s Fast Track programme. It could involve the
abolition of ‘pleadings’, to be replaced by non-technical, non-legalistic ‘case
135 See, eg, Justice Anthony Graham and Paul Graham, Victorian Pleading Precedents (LBC

Information Services, 2nd ed, 1997) 16.

136 Beaton-Wells, above n 47, 41–2.
137 Lord Woolf, Interim Report, above n 32, 153 [4].
138 See, eg, Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 47, 72–3 [10.8].
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statements’ in narrative form, or a ‘short and plain statement of the claim
showing the pleader is entitled to relief’ (as interpreted before Twombly), or preaction protocol information exchanged by the parties (as suggested by the Woolf
reforms in the UK). If pleadings could be reconceived as an exchange of
communications designed to provide a narrative of the litigants’ positions, they
may do a better job of providing the raw material needed to identify areas of
agreement, areas of dispute, and areas where additional information is required. 139 Even for those cases in which the disputes are straightforward and
hands-on management is not required, these narrative statements can do more
than traditional pleadings to fulfil the ‘notice’ function and define the issues
sufficiently for the parties to proceed to mediation, settlement or trial.
We do not expect such a change, in isolation, to work miracles. History, even
recent history, shows that attempts to change pleadings regimes can have
unintended consequences. In South Australia, for example, two attempts to
reform pleadings resulted only in the new pleadings rules being used as ‘tactical
weapons and as a means to oppress opponents’, 140 with pleadings becoming too
long and so particularised as to be almost unintelligible. 141 There is also some
evidence that Lord Woolf’s pre-action protocols can be abused to increase costs
and delay while still avoiding real disclosure and issue narrowing. 142 Furthermore, notice pleading can be abused when it is so conclusory as to be noninformative. Adding judicial supervision to the mix, however, could be what
makes the difference. 143 As the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia
noted, ‘[t]he issues in a case are better addressed directly rather than through the
guise of an application relating to a pleading.’ 144
B Issue Identification through Case Management
Can case management achieve a level of candour and focus that pleadings
have not achieved? We think that it has this potential. There is a historic precedent for this approach: the use of an early case conference to lead the parties
toward legally viable claims is in some ways a throwback to oral pleading,
where the representatives of both parties met with the judge and bandied
allegations back and forth until a claim and denial emerged that matched an
existing legal theory. 145 Modern case management offers various ways of
achieving the desired goals.
Differential case management sets and enforces interim deadlines and directly
or indirectly limits discovery, either in an order specifically tailored for an
139 Elizabeth Fajans and Mary R Falk, ‘Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice’

(2009) 15 Journal of the Legal Writing Institute 3, 54.
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 47, 71 [10.3].
Beaton-Wells, above n 47, 49.
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Review, Report No 14 (2008) 134–5.
See also Project Board of the Civil Courts Review, Scottish Court Service, Report of the Scottish
Civil Courts Review (2009) vol 2, 138 [60], 145 [116], which recommends abbreviated pleadings
as well as case management.
144 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 47, 72 [10.7].
145 Langbein, Lerner and Smith, above n 8, 149–52.
140
141
142
143

2011]

Defining Civil Disputes: Lessons from Two Jurisdictions

229

individual case or by assigning cases to ‘tracks’ with default limits and deadlines. This type of management encourages issue narrowing indirectly, because
the parties must prioritise their efforts in order to meet the deadlines and
efficiently discover the most relevant information. Empirical data suggest that
shortened deadlines for discovery correlate directly with lower attorney work
hours and shorter times to disposition (both of which presumably reduce party
costs). 146 In many cases, this type of management is all that is needed, but
unfortunately, it can be undermined. This is the case, for example, if one side
acts to obstruct timely discovery, especially if the other side lacks pre-suit access
to important information; if deadlines are ignored; or if sanctions for noncompliance are weak or not enforced. These examples demonstrate that such types of
case management neither clarify the issues nor further the just resolution of
disputes.
Issue management, on the other hand, attempts in a more direct way to cajole
opposing lawyers into communicating frankly in a meeting with the judge (and
sometimes in the presence of their clients). These case conferences seek to lead
the parties to consensus about which issues are genuinely disputed and worth the
cost of litigating. Rule 16 of the FRCP explicitly authorises such case conferences. They are also provided for in the rules and legislation of Australian state
jurisdictions, and the Federal Court of Australia’s Fast Track programme has
incorporated them as a cornerstone of its case management approach.
Existing models provide some evidence of the potential of case management
to achieve early issue identification. The Fast Track rules of the Federal Court of
Australia, for example, require parties to attend an initial conference about six
weeks after the case is filed. 147 Lawyers must bring to this conference an initial
witness list with a very brief summary of each witness’s expected testimony. In
addition, the parties are asked to outline the issues and facts that appear to be in
dispute. 148 In a similar way, the manual prepared for US federal judges suggests
that at the initial pre-trial conference the judge should ask the lawyers ‘direct and
leading questions’ such as ‘What do you expect to prove and how? How do you
expect to defeat this claim?’ 149 The specificity of the judge’s inquiry, directed at
all parties, can educate both the court and the lawyers and help get to the heart of
the dispositive issues. Some cases may only require this initial conference to
achieve focus and impose a pre-trial schedule, while others will require further
time for discovery and additional issue and deadline management. While there is
still little hard data documenting time or cost savings across the board, lawyers
who are surveyed tend to express a desire for the kind of ‘adult supervision’ that
judicial management entails. 150
146 James S Kakalik et al, ‘Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act

Evaluation Data’ (1998) 39 Boston College Law Review 613, 666–8.

147 Fast Track Directions [6.1].
148 Ibid pt 6. This process assumes that by the time this type of claim is filed, the parties already

have engaged in extensive communications and have access to all or most of the relevant documents and witnesses.
149 Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, above n 4, 22.
150 Richard L Marcus, ‘E-Discovery beyond the Federal Rules’ (2008) 37 University of Baltimore
Law Review 321, 330; Thomas E Willging et al, ‘An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclo-
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The above analysis assumes, of course, that judges are skilled at identifying
the cases in which this type of management is appropriate, 151 skilled at facilitating the type of conversations that make management work, and able to avoid the
biases about persons or issues that can come with this kind of close involvement
in developing the case. It also assumes that the system as a whole can be
designed to deter the kind of strategic behaviour by parties and lawyers that
makes it so difficult for pleadings to clarify disputes. The next section addresses
these challenges.
IV MAKING ISSUE MANAGEMENT WORK
A number of systemic changes would be required to maximise the potential for
issue management (and even deadline-setting) to succeed. Much would depend
on two things: adjustment of incentives, and training of lawyers, judges, and
court staff. In addition, courts would need adequate resources to allow the
tracking and supervision of cases and to provide for prompt trials and decisions.
Case management will function properly only as an adjunct to a fullyfunctioning, adequately resourced system of adjudication.
A Lawyers
If lawyers are to embrace judge-led issue management, they would first have
to be given reasons to forsake pleading applications and motions. What is
needed is not an inspirational lecture about a culture shift, but a change in rules
and incentives. First, the pleading rules would need amendment, as described
above, so that the structure and content of pleadings would be calibrated to
facilitate a management conference and not to provide factual detail. Applications and motions requesting greater particularity should be strongly disfavoured
and permitted only in response to an incomprehensible pleading. 152
Second, ethics rules and norms in some jurisdictions might need adjustment, to
make clear that a lawyer’s duty to the client does not include raising claims and
defences that are neither supported by evidence nor likely to be so after a
reasonable opportunity for discovery. Depending on the jurisdiction, this might
involve amending the ethics rules, issuing an authoritative ethics opinion, 153 or
even enacting legislation insulating lawyers from malpractice liability claims
based on a refusal to pursue unjustified claims or defences. 154 Informal norms
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are also important here. Professional training and law firm mentoring should
encourage young lawyers to identify and assert only justified positions, should
support them when they forego unjustified positions, and should help them
develop the skills needed to isolate significant disputed issues.
Third, cost rules would have to change to avoid rewarding lawyers for litigating pleadings issues. 155 If lawyers have more to gain from pleadings disputes
than from management conferences, or more to gain from prolonging the case
than from ending it expeditiously, some will tend to cling to the motions and the
applications for particulars. Where pleadings motions are filed without legal
justification, or where frivolous legal positions are taken in pleadings, lawyers
could be ordered to pay costs. Even if lawyer self-interest is not a significant
problem, lawyers need training to equip them to advise clients about costs and to
enable clients to compare the costs and benefits of fighting about pleadings. In
order to enforce the obligation to provide this type of information, litigation
budgets might become a feature of managed cases. 156
Finally, some pleadings specialists (in Australia, primarily barristers) — those
lawyers who cherish their pleading art, to paraphrase former Chief Justice
Black — will in appropriate cases have to forgo their ‘artist’s delight in a finely
drawn statement of claim or an elegant defence’ 157 for a less traditional approach, but one that more effectively facilitates issue management. Chief Justice
Black’s analysis is reminiscent of Holdsworth’s view that pleaders of centuries
past who extolled the purity of pleading ‘were inclined to cherish all parts of
their science, and to cut down all projects of change to a minimum.’ 158
B Litigants
There are limits to what can be accomplished with attempts to induce a more
cooperative attitude among lawyers. Pressure to take unwarranted positions may
come from clients. Even when litigants are given full information about costs, it
is and will be in the interest of some litigants to delay the resolution of the
controversy and to increase the opponent’s costs. It is unreasonable to expect
that all litigants will willingly forfeit strategic but permitted uses of the procedure rules. Incentives are therefore needed to adjust litigant behaviour.
Lawsuits represent real disputes and litigants are asserting real rights. Case
management is not a licence to force parties to abandon supportable positions or
to ignore the importance of enforcing substantive norms. ‘Identifying’ issues is
not always the equivalent of ‘narrowing’ them. Rather, case management can
affect litigant incentives by rewarding cooperation, by ruling promptly on pre155 A A S Zuckerman, ‘Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice: Plus ça change …’ (1996) 59 Modern Law

Review 773, 775–8.

156 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 50(1)(a)(ii) states that a court may make an order at any time in

a civil proceeding directing a lawyer ‘to prepare a memorandum setting out … the estimated
costs and disbursements in relation to the trial’. But see ibid 785–6, where it is noted that Lord
Woolf’s suggestion that litigation budgets be introduced to increase predictability and proportionality resulted in an outcry from the legal profession, and the idea was not pursued.
157 Black, above n 1, 91.
158 Holdsworth, ‘The New Rules of Pleading’, above n 13, 265.
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trial disputes so that bad behaviour loses some of its power to generate delay, by
setting and then keeping early trial dates, and by imposing interim cost orders
where appropriate.
In more extreme cases, litigant incentives may need to be punitive, so that
those who abuse the process and encourage their lawyers to take unreasonable
positions are themselves at risk. In Australia, for example, overriding obligations
are being extended by legislation to parties, 159 insurers and litigation funders. 160
Procedure rules in the US and Australia allow courts to impose sanctions on
litigants when they are responsible for unsupported factual allegations or fail to
cooperate with case management processes. 161 Sanctions are calibrated by their
ability to deter the offending party, and others similarly situated, from continuing
to find obstructive behaviour more rewarding than good faith compliance with
court orders and procedure rules. First instance and appellate courts, in turn,
must have the will to use the sanctions if the rules are to have any chance of
addressing the conduct of litigants who prefer a scorched earth, take-noprisoners approach to litigation. 162
C Judges
Judges are not universally enthusiastic about case management. If case management is to be the primary tool for issue identification, judges’ incentives need
attention and sustained, high-quality training is crucial. Incentives and training
would go hand in hand, and empirical research is important to both.
Empirical research indicates that a majority of cases proceed smoothly to
settlement, with proportional costs and little delay. 163 To invest time and energy
in judicial issue management in these cases (especially management techniques
that frontload costs) would be wasteful and increase costs for both parties and
courts. Therefore, an important topic for research is to identify the characteristics
of cases that will benefit from issue management. This information can, in turn,
help persuade judges that it is in their own interests to identify those cases in
which some early and continuing hands-on management will actually save time
and help move the disputes efficiently toward settlement or trial. This kind of
targeted management could also be less daunting for those judges who were
acculturated as barristers to value a passive judicial role.
Research can also identify techniques that facilitate issue identification without sacrificing legitimate claims or defences. It is already clear that case management works best in individual docket systems, where a single judge is
assigned to supervise a case from beginning to end and statistics are kept on an
159 See, eg, Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(3); Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 10; Federal
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161 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 18, 23, 28–31, 42, 46–53; FRCP rr 11(c), 16(f) (2011).
162 See also Kakalik et al, Evaluation of Judicial Case Management, above n 146, xxxiii, which
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individual judge basis in order to help assess what is working and what is not. 164
Empirical investigation can also help identify which types of management
techniques are effective, and can guide training programmes for judges and their
staff.
The degree of discretion and difficulty in setting standards for case management leads to a potential problem with which training must also contend: case
management orders may vary substantially from judge to judge. Some judges
reject a managerial role (either because they believe in a more passive role or
because they are sceptical that management is an efficient use of their time),
while others embrace it. Even among those who attempt to manage all or some
of the cases in their courts, different judges will reach different conclusions
about which disputes are genuine, how much discovery is appropriate, and how
much time should be allowed for pre-trial phases. Judges, because they are
human, are subject to biases arising out of their own personal and professional
training and experience. 165 Standards and training about case management must
recognise this phenomenon and do what is possible to guide judges and minimise unacceptable variations.
In addition, case management should not be envisioned as a way to provide
justice ‘on the cheap’. Rather, it needs adequate resources, including not only
research and training but also court personnel to supervise deadlines and
implement management tasks, and sophisticated information technology to track
and help enforce deadlines with less judicial involvement. Case management
techniques, in order to be successful, require adequate staffing of the courts so
that deadlines can be checked and enforced, mediators and other dispute
resolution practitioners can be supplied in a timely fashion, and cases that have
not settled can proceed promptly to trial. 166
Until further research is done, we are agnostic about whether simplified pleading plus case management will lower costs for courts or for litigants. Information
about the Federal Court of Australia’s Fast Track programme is encouraging, but
at this early stage, still impressionistic and anecdotal. 167 We are confident,
however, that the approach proposed in this article offers more effective early
issue identification than is provided when fact pleading and pleading disputes
164 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘Litigation Management under the CPR: A Poorly-Used Management
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165 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J Rachlinski and Andrew J Wistrich, ‘Blinking on the Bench: How Judges
Decide Cases’ (2007) 93 Cornell Law Review 1, 2–3, reporting on a study showing that trial
judges rely on intuition in making their decisions.
166 See also Genn, above n 1, 125, who is of the view that ‘[w]e need modern, efficient civil courts
with appropriate procedures that offer affordable processes for those who would choose judicial
determination.’
167 See Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report (2009) vol 2,
592, where Lord Justice Jackson reported that Australian lawyers who had experience of the
Federal Court’s Fast Track process thought that it significantly reduced the costs of litigation.
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are the primary tools used to achieve focus and limits on the scope of litigation.
Even in a world in which court funding is inadequate, narrative statements will
provide better notice of claims and defences than stylised pleadings, and court
attention to scheduling and discovery disputes will use resources more effectively than the time currently spent on pleading motions.
D Early Issue Identification and the Need for Discovery
Where all litigants have pre-suit access to relevant information, early issue
management may be efficient and appropriate. In cases of information asymmetry, however, it is important that issue management not be imposed too rigorously nor too early, in ways that would undermine the ability of litigants to use
discovery to access the information they need. Otherwise it will also undermine
the ability of settled or tried outcomes to approximate the accurate application of
substantive law to ‘real’ facts. Taking early control is not the same as prematurely finalising issues and then prohibiting discovery.
In some cases, tailored discovery may be the best device for providing notice
and focusing the dispute. Production of key documents, and even the pre-trial
oral examination of key witnesses, may provide more information about disputed
and undisputed facts, and about the litigants’ contentions and denials, than any
amount of pleading or issue management. 168 Without adequate discovery, neither
pleadings nor case management will be able to achieve the ‘just’ resolution of
disputes called for by the principles underlying the rules of civil procedure.
V CONCLUSION
The experiences of Australia and the US illustrate the futility of relying on
pleadings alone to identify the issues in litigation. Nor is extended squabbling
about the specificity of pleadings an efficient or effective way to determine
which cases should move forward and what those cases should be about. Case
management, when used carefully and facilitated by case statements and
discovery, allows for the exploration of the merits of a case, while still keeping a
check on the proportionality of cost and the strategic use of delay.
To maximise efficiency and fairness, a management-based system requires an
empirical basis, adequate resources, excellent training, and judicial selfawareness to combat the risk of arbitrariness, bias, and inequity. It also requires
that courts have the power and the courage to enforce management orders (such
as deadlines) against parties who fail to meet their obligations.
Pleadings cannot bear the entire weight of giving notice and limiting disputes.
It is time to abandon both the ‘elaborate minuet in which the participants follow
pre-ordained ritualistic rules gliding around and around each other without ever
coming into direct contact’ 169 and the ‘belts and suspenders’ approach where
both pleading and case management try to do the same thing. Instead, ‘plead168 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 142, 386–7, recommending pre-trial oral

examinations.
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ings’ (by whatever name) can be introductory statements that begin a structured
process of court-led conversations that identify the parameters and needs of
litigation. This allows reconceived pleadings and targeted case management to
go hand in hand in moving cases towards a just and timely resolution.

